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The Contribution of Chief Justice Dickson to an
Interpretive Framework and Value System for
Section 1 Of The Charter of Rights
Peter W. Hogg* and Roland Penner"
Editor's Note: The major address to the Dickson Legacy Symposium on Section 1 of the
Charterof Rights and Freedomswas delivered by Professor Peter Hogg of Osgoode Hall
Law School. However, the paper which he read was already committed to another
publication, The Dickson Years, 1973-1990, to be published by the Supreme Court of
Canada Historical Society and edited by Professor DeLloyd Guth of the Faculty of Law,
University of British Columbia. Accordingly, Professor Hogg's paper as delivered cannot
be published here in its complete form. What follows, by agreement with Professors
Hogg and Guth, is a synopsis of Hogg's paper and an expanded commentary by Roland
Penner, Dean of Law, University of Manitoba (part of which was delivered at the
symposium).
A. SYNOPSIS OF ADDRESS BY PETER W. HOGG
SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER I

provides as follows:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.

Section 1 not only makes it clear that rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter are not absolute, but sets the stage for a
definition of the limits which may be put on rights and freedoms by
requiring that those limits must be "prescribed by law," must be
"demonstrably justified," and perhaps most importantly for the judicial
evolution of a contemporary value system, must base thatjustification
on the current beliefs of a "free and democratic society."
The existence of Section 1, Professor Hogg believes, reflects the
influence of international human rights instruments; he compares
these instruments to the American Bill of Rights, which contains no

Osgoode Hall, York University.
Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba.
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.1.), 1982, c. 11.
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such clause and which, in the main, defines guaranteed rights in
seemingly unqualified terms.
Though the existence of Section 1 in the Canadian Chartermay be
justified as a vehicle for balancing individual and collective rights,
there is a clear and always present danger, Hogg suggests, that the
non-elected judiciary will assume the task of "re-doing the political
calculus of costs and benefits that has already been performed by an
elected legislative body." He sees this as a danger because of the nonaccountability of the judiciary and because the courts will often lack
the "expertise and resources to review the legislature's judgment that
a particular law will increase the general welfare."
It is Professor Hogg's thesis that the Supreme Court of Canada
under the leadership of Brian Dickson, beginning with his celebrated
and "brilliant opinion" in Oakes,2 has not only grappled boldly with
the seemingly intractable problem of "taking rights seriously" in such
circumstances, but, on the whole, has done so rather well.
Professor Hogg draws our attention to the development from
Oakes' to Edwards Books 4 and Irwin Toy' of a Section 1 test that is
rigorous in defence of guaranteed rights but yet, within the ambit of
a discretionary "margin of appreciation," is appropriately deferential
with respect to the mandate of Parliament and the legislatures.
Professor Hogg, in discussing the vital issues of the burden of proof
and the nature of the evidence to be adduced, asserts that the
Supreme Court (wisely, he thinks) is of the view that in the absence
of positive admissible evidence on the issue of justification it can
resort to common sense for proof. Nevertheless, Hogg points out, it is
risky for a government to appear at a hearing where, as will increasingly be the case, the issue is Section 1, without having built an
evidentiary basis for the government's justificatory argument.
Professor Hogg summarizes the four criteria developed in Oakes6
which must be satisfied for the law limiting a right to be qualified as
reasonable. These are: (1) sufficiently important objective; (2) rational
connection; (3) least drastic means; and (4) proportionate effect.
He points out that, in effect, it will most usually be the issue of
least drastic means which troubles the court. He cites a number of
2 R.

v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 1781.

3Ibid.
'R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
'Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, (1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
6

Supra, note 2.
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cases in which the law in question has failed the requirement of least
drastic means: the CriminalCode's felony-murder rule held to be too
drastic a means of discouraging the use of weapons by criminals in R.
v. Vaillancourt; Quebec's prohibition of the use of English in
commercial signs held to be too drastic a means of protecting the
French language (although requiring the use of French is acceptable)
in Ford v. Quebec;8 Alberta's rule prohibiting Alberta lawyers from
entering into partnership with lawyers not resident in Alberta held to
be too drastic a means of regulating the standards of the legal
profession in Black v. Law Society of Alberta;9 Alberta's statutory
prohibition of the publication of accounts of matrimonial litigation
held to be too drastic a means of safeguarding the privacy of individuals in Edmonton Journalv. Alberta.0
However, as he points out, it "is rarely self-evident that a law
limiting a Charterright does so by the least drastic means." It would
not be difficult for a judge so inclined to find less drastic means than
those actually employed, but such a stretching of the point will involve
an abandonment of "some degree of deference to legislative choices."
It is particularly in a federal state where there are likely to be some
appreciable differences in the choice of the means to accomplish the
same goal by various legislatures that there should be, Hogg argues,
what European judges have termed a "margin of appreciation" - i.e.
a "zone of discretion within which different legislative choices in
derogation of a Charterright could be tolerated."
It is in light of this need that, Hogg suggests, the Supreme Court
of Canada has moved away from the apparently categorical language
of Oakes" to something closer to a "margin of appreciation" test
with, e.g., the concept of reasonableness being added in Edwards
Books. 2 In that case La Forest J. put it: "A legislature must be given
reasonable room to manoeuvre." Subsequently, in Irwin Toy, 3 the
court actually used the phrase "margin of appreciation."

1[1987] 2 S.C.R. 636.
8 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790.
9 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
10 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
'1 Supra, note 2.
'2 Supra, note 4.
'3 Supra, note 5.
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The results of the cases where the court has moved away from the
strictness of the Oakes" test "makes for an unpredictable jurisprudence" Hogg argues, but, he suggests "there is no practical way to
avoid uncertainty" in this area.
"During the public debate that preceded the adoption of the Charter
of Rights, there was controversy about the desirability of a limitation
clause, the conventional view being that the clause weakened the
Charter.But Dickson C.J.'s powerful judgment in Oakes15 has given
to Section 1 the role of actually strengthening the Charter. The
stringent requirements of justification imposed in that judgment are
undoubtedly more difficult to discharge than the requirements that
would have been imposed by the courts in the absence of a limitation
clause. Although Oakes 6 has been softened by the idea of a 'margin
of appreciation,' it remains the keystone of judicial review under the
Charter,and the most important of Dickson C.J.'s many contributions
to the development of a systematic, principled, Charter jurisprudence,"
Hogg concludes.
B. COMMENTARY BY ROLAND PENNER

PETER HOGG'S CLEAR OVERVIEW of Section 1 and the developing
jurisprudence thereunder invites a comment in particular on the
critically important issue of '"east drastic means" - i.e. the employment in the challenged statute by the legislature or Parliament, as the
case may be, of the least drastic means for restricting the guaranteed
right in order to achieve the desired objective. As he points out, like
so many major touchstones in law (notoriously "reasonableness"),
"least drastic means" can become treacherously subjective and leave
the test of the least drastic means as open-ended, or at least as
multifarious, as are the views of individual judges.
It is useful, indeed necessary, to pay attention here to the mounting
criticism of judicial review in the era of the Charterby a substantial
number of respected critics, e.g. Petter, 1 Glasbeek and Mandel,"3

1

Supra, note 2.

5 Supra, note

2.

16Ibid.
17A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter'sHidden Agenda" (1987) 45 Advocate
857.
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Bakan,19 much earlier Ison2" and many others, all of whom are
concerned, inter alia, about the displacement of political discourse by
legal discourse; that is to say the relatively undemocratic substitution
of the views and will of a non-elected and tenured judiciary for the
views and will of elected and untenured politicians. I suppose that
even the strongest critic of judicial review would admit that political
discourse at the parliamentary level is only formally democratic and
can by no means be said to respond to the popular will on any given
issue at any particular time.21 A further question, addressed later in
these comments, is whether in "trumping" the challenged legislation
by "legal discourse" the judiciary can be said to be responding - if not
all of the time then most of the time - to what might be defined, on
the issue before them, as the popular will.
In coming to what might seem like, and I suppose at least in part
is, a defence of the Charter and of the judicial review it necessarily
invites, I hope that I will not per se be categorized out of hand as a
collaborator in the 'legalization of politics" (Glasbeek and Mandel) or
a fellow traveller on the train of "judicial imperium" (to use a phrase
originally coined by Peter Russell). My point in this commentary is
that if, as appears to be the case, the ambit of judicial review in
Chartercases has been narrowed by the conscious use of a deferential
test like the "margin of appreciation," we may well have the beginnings of an acceptable use of judicial powers - although the matter
does not end there by any means.
Glasbeek and Mandell, in referring to the Charter, state at the
outset of their important article on the Legalization of Politics:
Thus, the judiciary has been given a central role to play in Canadian socio-political
affairs, beyond the role of umpire between the two levels of government. It has become
a recognized participant.'
18

HJ.Glasbeek and M. Mandel, 'The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies/Etudes

Socialistes: A Canadian Annual 84.
19
J.Bakan, "Strange Expectations: a review of the two themes ofjudicial review" (1990)
35 McGill L.J. 439.
" T.G. Ison, 'The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1985) 10 Adelaide L.R. 1, reprinted in
(1986) 27 Les Cahiers de Droit 503.
21 viz the debate about the legitimacy of the federal government using a parliamentary
mitiority and a made-for-the-occasion Senate majority to pass the controversial and
vigorously opposed statute authorizing the Goods and Services Tax.
2 Supra, note 18 at 84.
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In my view, there has been no time in the history of constitutional
adjudication in Canada that the courts at any level merely played the
role of "umpire" and did not, for the most part, play a value laden
"political role." (One can only hope that the burgeoning discipline of
Canadian legal history will soon tackle in some depth the "myth of the
umpire.") In any event, although enhanced by it, judicial review is not
a child of the Charter and certainly not, I would argue, its "enfant
terrible." We lost our innocence with respect to judicial review not in
1982, but circa 1876/78, the years immediately following the passage
of the Supreme Court Act,' when the Court delivered its first
division of powers judgments, thereby making a political decision i.e. a decision with clear political consequences. Surely there is not
much that can be more political than, in effect, re-distributing
legislative power in a federal state.
No doubt the Charterhas greatly enhanced - or more appropriately widened - the scope of judicial review, but it certainly did not
invent it! When a court strikes down a statute because it is held to be
ultravires, it is in effect legislating and, either implicitly or sometimes
very explicitly, putting aside the veil of doctrine and revealing a policy
and a value bias. In the game of constitutional jurisprudence the
umpire is never blind. The courts have not just become participants:
they always were!
Secondly, this implied notion of the arrogation of power by the
judiciary (often described in those terms in popular legal journalism)
fails to take sufficient account of the undeniable fact that it was "we
the people" who, through a very democratic constitutional process,
conferred upon the judiciary that duty and that power; and it is "we
the people" who, albeit not without some considerable difficulty, can
take that power away by amendment to the ConstitutionAct, 1982 or
through the use of the "override," the notwithstanding clause.24
That said, the issue remains: how wisely has the power of judicial
review been used and to what effect? A related issue is defined by the
argument, frequently enough heard, that even if the Charteris used
wisely now, there is nothing to guarantee that it will be used wisely
in the future. Here, essentially, we must look to Section 1 jurisprudence both in terms of the analytical model developed to date and,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,
s. 33. With respect to the democratic process leading up to the passage of the Act and,
in particular, the final formulation of the Charter, see, e.g., S. Robinson, "The NDP, the
Charter and the Constitution" (1981) 61 Canadian Forum 14.
21Constitution Act,
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more fundamentally, to the policy parameters expressed or implied in
the cases; and, even more fundamentally I would suggest, to those
things which appear to shape judicial opinion at least as much as and,
in the case of Dickson or the Dickson Court, more than the individual
value systems of the judges.
As Hogg points out in his paper, the analytical model which the
Court has developed is now a great deal more than the structure and
formulae originally developed, primarily by Dickson, in Oakes.'
As it stands today that model is also infused with a set of values
which is perhaps Dickson's greatest contribution. Peter Hogg outlined
them in his paper as including "respect for the dignity of the human
person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of
a wide variety of beliefs and respect for cultural and group identity."
I cite one case for specifics: Slaight Communicationsv. Davidson,"
but I could as well have chosen Irwin Toy 7 or Edwards Books."
At issue in Slaight was a labour mediator's remedial order in an
unjust dismissal case, which remedial order palpably limited the
employer's freedom of expression by ordering it to give a well defined
though factual letter of reference to the unjustly dismissed employee
and further ordering it not to reply to inquiries in anything but the
same terms. Since it was undeniable that this amounted to a first
stage denial of Charter guaranteed freedom of expression, a second
stage recourse to Section 1 became necessary.
In discussing the application in Slaight of Section 1, Dickson
referred to his statement in Oakes" about underlying values essential to a free and democratic society including the inherent dignity of
the human person and commitment to social justice and equality and,
specifically, in the labour law context said:
It cannot be over-emphasized that the adjudicator's remedy in this case was a
legislatively-sanctioned attempt to remedy the unequal balance of power that normally
exists between an employer and employee.'

2

Supra, note 2.

26 Slaight CommunicationsInc. v. Davidson, (1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
2
2

Supra, note 5.
Supra, note 4.

" Supra, note 2.

so Supra, note 25.
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One thinks as well of the moving references in Edwards Books to
the social significance of a common pause- day and to the disadvantaged position of marginalized retail clerks,"1 and of the reference in
Irwin Toy 2 to the court's concern with the vulnerable in our population, in that case children.
As pointed out by Lynn Smith,' in Brooks' and Janzene - not
Charter cases it is true - Dickson for a unanimous court in each
instance wrote about the vulnerability and changing role of women in
the workplace.
It is not only right but in my view essential to point to these
statements as significant value parameters within which the Dickson
court has developed at least the beginnings of or basis for a humanistic Section 1 jurisprudence."8
It is right to attribute much of this to the very special genius of the
person we honour today. However, it would be wrong in my view to
say, as some critics of judicial review under the Charter do, that this
is ephemeral, the influence of one unique individual, and that over the
long haul the underlying bias will be the essential conservatism of the
judiciary.
This is an understandable concern, but what it misses, I think, is
what I have sometimes referred to as the symbiotic relationship
between the judiciary and the particular society in which it operates.
In his well-known essay "The Death of Law?, 3 Owen Fiss writes,
in part, about law appearing both as "generative of public values" and
"dependent upon them."
The Warren Court and the transformative process that it precipitated in American
society not only presupposed a belief in the existence of public values but was also
responsible for it. 38
31Supra, note
2

3 Supra, note

4.
5.

L. Smith, "The Equality Rights," supra at 376.
3'Brooks v. CanadaSafeway Ltd. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
3

Janzen v. Platy EnterprisesLtd. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 382 (S.C.C.).
And see in this respect E.P. Mendes, "In Search of a Theory of Social Justice: The
Supreme Court Reconceives the Oakes Test" (1990) 24:1 R.J.T. 1.
37 0. Fiss, "The Death of Law?" (1986) 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1. (In his article in this
collection Peter Russell raises but does not deal with the critical issue of what he calls
"the transmission belts" which connect judicial opinions to popular political culture.)
38Ibid.

at 15.
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Which comes first, the Warren Court or the civil rights movement?
Which came first in Canada, the women's movement or such judgments as (in the example of the women's movement) Brookss and
Janzen,"' the aboriginal rights movement or judgments like
2 the general commitment in
Guerin" and Sparrow,"
contemporary
Canadian society to social justice or the Dickson Court as in, e.g.,
Edwards Books?"
This is not at all to denigrate from the contribution of Brian
Dickson but to recognize his and the Supreme Court's highly important contribution in rooting Section 1 in the kind of contemporary
values which are said to make Canada a distinct society and are far
more populist than elitist. This is a legacy which, in my view, will not
soon or easily or perhaps, one hopes, ever disappear from Canada's
legal and political landscape.
Harry Arthurs recently proposed that when the short term effects
of Charter jurisprudence subside, "when the adaptive mechanisms run
their course the direct effect of Charterdecisions will appear as but a
grace-note in the historic symphony of economics, cultural and social
change.'
Perhaps! And perhaps, as Arthurs concludes in his 'Tight to Golf'
speech, 'life will likely go on, as it does now and as it has always
done, relatively unaffected by law."'
This is quite another and, no doubt, a fundamental discussion.
My point is that, to the extent life is affected by law and our polity
by the Charter, the Dickson Legacy has been, substantially, to
democratize and humanize the application of Section 1 and, in so
doing, to return, as far as the courts can, the fundamental law of the
land not so much to Parliament and the legislatures as to "we the
people," where, in the final analysis, it really belongs.

39

Supra, note 34.

40

Supra, note 35.

"Guerin v. R., [19841 2 S.C.R. 335.
42 (1990), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
4Supra,

note 4.

"HI-W. Arthurs, 'The Right to Golf: Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions and
the Rest of Us Under the Charter"(1988) 13 Queen's L.J. 17.
5
4

Ibid at 31.

